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Abstract
We
We design
design and
and evaluate
cvaluate a simple
simple and scalable system to verify Quality of Service (QoS) in a differentiated sermeasurement agents collecting
vices
The system uses
uscs a distributed edge-to-edge monitoring approach with measurement
vices domain.
domain. The
information about delays,
Agreement Monitor (SLAM).
thl-oughput. and reporting to a Service Level Agreement
delays. losses and throughput.
The
service attacks, and flags the need to reThe SLAM
SLAM detects potential service violations. bandwidth theft. denial of scrvice
Illay
edge-to-edge, or the core
dimension the network domain or limit its users. Measurements n
~ a ybe performed entirely edge-to-edge.
routers may pal1
icipate in logging
pa~iicipate
logging packet drop
drop information.
infolmation. We compare the core-assisted and edge-to-edge schemes.
and
and we
we extend network tomography-based loss inference mechanisms to cope with different drop precedences in a
QoS
QoS network.
network. We
We also
also develop
develop a load-based service monitoring
monitol-ins scheme which probes the appropriate edge routers for
loss
loss and
and throughput on demand. Simulation results indicate that the system detects attacks with reasonable accuracy.
and
and is
is useful
useful for
for damage
dainaze control in both QoS-enabled and best effort network domains.
Keywords:
Keywords:
Service.
Sewice.

Service
Network Monitol-ing,
Monitoring, Network Security.
Security, Quality of
of
Sel-vice Level Agreements, Network Tomography. Network

Introduction
11 Introduction
Internet security lapses
University of
of
lapses have cost U.S. corporations 5.7 percent of their annual revenue, as reported by University
at Davis
Davis economist Frank Bernhard [13].
[13]. Specifically,
Specifically: the increase in the number of
California at
of denial of
of service attacks
(12,805
2:805 reported by the San Diego Supercomputer Center in February 200
(J
20011 [24]), implies that bandwidth theft attacks
support. Hence, monitoring network activity is
can become widespread in networks with Quality of Service (QoS) support.
to maintain confidence in the security and QoS of networks, from both the user (ensuring the service level
required to
for is
is indeed obtained) and provider (ensuring no unusual activity or attacks take place) perspectives.
paid for
perspectives. Developing
Developing
low cost
cost distributed
distributed monitoring system is the primary focus
focus of this paper.
aa low
We use
use the
the differentiated
differentiated services
services (DS) QoS framework as an underlying network, though our system is not specific
We
to DS.
DS. Packets entering a DS
DS domain are classified and the DS field in the 1P
to
IP header is marked at the edge router [25].
The packets
packets then experience specific
specific per-hop behaviors (PHBs) as they are forwarded by the interior (core) routers
The
field. Currently, the Expedited Forwarding (EF) PHB [19]
the domain depending
depending on their DS field.
of the
[19] and the Assured
[18] have been defined.
defined. The EF
E F PHB can be used
(AF) PHBs [18]
llsed to build a low loss, low latency, end-to-end
Forwarding (AF)
service. The
The AF
A F PHB
PHB offers different levels of forwarding assurances, each with three drop precedences (e.g., green,
service.
red). Typically,
Typically. a user has a service
service level agreement (SLA) with a provider
yellow and red).
provider that describes the expected
service, user traffic profile,
profile: and charging models. The provider uses SLAs, along with other mechanisms, to provision
provision
service,
the network appropriately.
appropriately.
the
service classes can attract attacks that inject marked packets to steal bandDifferences in charging models of the service
width and
and other network resources.
resources. Such attacks make use of known vulnerabilities in firewall filter rules to inject
width
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traffic or spoof the identity of valid users with high QoS levels.
levels. Since the DS framework is based on
011 aggregation of
flows into service classes, valid user traffic may experience degraded QoS as a result of the injected traffic. Taken to an
extreme,
extreine, the attacks may result in denial of service. This creates a need for developing an effective defense mechanism
that can automate
auto~iiatethe detection and reaction to attacks on the QoS-provisioned DS network domain.
domain.
measurement of path characteristics [26,
126: 27]
271 and network monitoring [5,
[5, 14,
14: 20]
201 have been extensively
Although ~neasurenient
investigated,
[lo]. Inspired by recent results on network
investigated. few studies of user SLA validation have been performed [!O].
tomography
[I: 6,
6: 7],
71: we infer internal characteristics
characteristics of a network domain using edge-to-edge probes, and design a
toniography [1,
distributed monitoring system to detect service violations and bandwidth theft in a network domain.
domain. We employ agents
on
011 selected routers of the DS domain to efficiently measure packet delays,
delays, loss, and throughputs.
throughp~~ts.
Measurements are
communicated to an SLA Monitor (SLAM). The SLAM analyzes measurements and automatically detects potential
attacks and
aiid violations of negotiated SLAs,
SLAs, as well as flag the need to re-provision the network by increasing capacity
or limiting users.
We also compare core-assisted
core-assisted and pure edge-to-edge approaches for packet loss ratio computation. The comparison can help network providers decide which technique best serves their needs. We inject probes only when necessary
to reduce communication
comnlunication overhead. Moreover, we extend stripe-based loss inference [15]
[I 51 to cope with different drop
precedences in a QoS network. Throughput measurements are only performed when a delay or loss violation is reported. As with any detection mechanism, the attackers can attach the mechanism itself,
itself: but we assume the cost to
attack this distributed monitoring mechanism is higher than the cost to inject or spoof traffic, or bypass a single edge
router,
router.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related work. Section 3 describes the highlevel architecture
architecture used in our service violation detection system. Section 4 gives the methodology of measurements and
SLA violation detection. Section 5 discusses when to probe the network based on network load. Section 6 presents our
simulation
si~nulationexperiments and results. Finally, section 7 summarizes our conclusions and recommendations for enhanced
security.

2 Related
Related Work
A number of related studies have investigated differentiated services security, measurements of QoS parameters, network tomography and monitoring, and SLA verification.

2.1
2.1

Network Security

A security analysis for the differentiated services framework is provided in [32].
[32]. QoS attacks are classified as either
attacking the network provisionitzg
provisioning process, or attacking the data fonvardirzg
forwarding process. Network provisioning involves
configuration of DS nodes by policy distribution points in the network (Bandwidth Brokers (BBs)), through RSVP
[4]
[4] or SNMP [9].
[9]. This process can be attacked by injecting bogus configuration messages,
messages, modifying the content of
real configuration messages, delaying or dropping such messages.
messages. Networks can be secured against such attacks by
employing encryption of the configuration messages.
messages. Attacks on the data forwarding
forwarding process are of a more serious
nature and can involve injecting traffic into the network with an intent to steal bandwidth or to cause QoS degradation
by causing other user flows to experience longer delays, higher loss rates, and lower throughput. Our goal is to detect
attacks on the data forwarding
forwarding process by monitoring the characteristics
characteristics of a network domain.

2.2
2.2 Performance
Performance Measurements
Measurements
A large body of research has focused on measuring delay, loss, and throughput in the Internet [26,
[26: 27].
271. Shared Passive
Network Performance Discovery (SPAND)
(SPAND) [29]
[29] is a tool that communicates with distant Internet hosts and reports to
a performance server in the same domain. Sharing history to improve future
future measurement was proven useful. Savage
et al propose Detour routers as edge devices in Internet clouds that will tunnel traffic to improve Internet performance
[28].
[28]. These edge routers exchange bandwidth, latency, drop rate among themselves. We also employ
einploy intelligent routers
at key access points that monitor a network domain.
architecture to detect
domain. Resilient Overlay Networks (RON) is an architecture
perfoflllance [2].
and recover from path outages and periods of degraded perfom>ance
[2]. RON nodes monitor the quality of Internet
paths among then~selves
themselves and use this infonnation to route packets, optimizing application-specific routing metrics.
RON uses three different routing metrics: latency, loss and throughput. Measurement techniques in SPAND,
SPAND. Detour,
and RON are useful but not directly applicable to violation detection in a QoS network domain.

2

2.3
2.3 Network
Network Tomography
Network tomography
ton~ographyis
is an approach to infer the internal behavior of a network based on purely end-to-end measureJ]. A number of studies l[ J,
delay, and discover the topology
topoJogy of
of a
ments
ments [3
[3J].
I . 6,
6. 7]
71 have shown how to infer loss and delay.
multicast network. Coates and Nowark [I
[I I,
1. 12]
121 discuss delay and loss inference using unicast probing in order to
monitor TCP
S] use packet "stripes"
TCP flows
flows [31].
[31]. Duffield et al
al [J
[I51
"stripes" (back-to-back probe packets) to infer link loss by
computing
probing,
computing the correlations among
among packet losses within a stripe at the destinations. Using end-to-end unicast probing.
the
the authors
authors demonstrate
demonstrate how to infer loss characteristics of the links in the network interior. We extend this technique
to
to infer Joss
loss in
in a QoS
QoS domain and show how to detect service violations and attacks in that domain based on inferred
values.
values.

2.4
2.4 Network
Network Monitoring
Many
Many proposals for
for network monitoring [S,
[5>J4]
141 ensure that a network is operating within desirable parameters. In
efficient reactive
[ 141. the authors discuss ways to monitor communication overhead in IP networks. Their
reactive monitoring [14],
main idea is
is to
to combine global polling with local event driven reporting. Our core-assisted scheme also uses local event
[S] identify effective
driven
driven reporting and performs global polling only when it is absolutely necessary. Breitbart et al [5]
techniques to
probing-based techniques where
to monitor bandwidth and latency in IP networks. The authors present pr-obi~ig-based
path latencies
of control. The paper describes algorithms to
latencies are
are measured by transmitting probes from a single point of
compute an
an optimal set of probes to measure latency of paths in a network. We focus on monitoring a network domain
to
to detect attacks.
attacks. For scalability,
scalability, our approach involves only edge routers in any QoS parameter measurement.

2.5
2.5 SLA Verification
Verification
In
In [10],
[lo], a histogram-based aggregation algorithm is used to detect SLA violations. The algorithm measures network
characteristics
characteristics on a hop-by-hop basis and uses them to compute end-to-end measurements and validate end-to-end
SLA
SLA requirements. In large
large networks,
networks, efficient collection of management data is a challenge. While exhaustive data
Furthermore, the authors assume that the routes used
collection yields
yields a complete
complete picture, there is an added overhead. Furthermore.
by SLA
[8] provisioning. We use average values to reduce constraints on the
SLA flows
flows are
are known, citing VPN and MPLS [8]
network setup,
setup, and eliminate
eliminate the need for knowledge of the set of flows traversing each router.

33 Architecture for
for SLA Violation Detection
Differentiated Services
of traffic. The
Services (DS)
(DS) [3]
[3] pushes complexity to boundary devices which process lower volumes of
domain, called ingress routers, perform traffic conditioning that consists of
boundary routers where traffic enters a domain,
of
fields in the packet header, traffic metering to ensure conformance to a profile:
traffic classification based on multiple fields
profile,
marking, dropping, shaping
shaping or remarking of out-of-profile traffic. Core routers perform simple forwarding based
marking,
based on
SLAs between the user and provider networks are used to derive filter rules for traffic classification
the DS
DS field.
field. SLAs
the
classification
at the
the ingress
ingress routers.
routers. Therefore, ingress routers with appropriate configuration of
of filter rules should prevent nonat
conforming traffic
traffic from
from entering a DS domain. Though ingress routers serve as a good first line of
conforming
of defense.
defense, attackers
can still
still succeed in injecting non-conforming traffic into a DS domain in a variety of
of ways, e.g.:
can

I . Attackers can impersonate a legitimate user by spoofing flow identity (IP
(lP addresses, protocol and port numbers).
I.
filtering [16]
[I 61 at routers in the user network can detect such spoofing if
Network filtering
if the attacker and the impersonated
subnets, but the attacks proceed unnoticed otherwise.
are on different subnets,
user are
2. Attackers can devise
devise mechanisms
meclianis~nsto bypass the ingress routers by exploiting some well known vulnerabilities in
2.
the firewall
firewall filters.
filters. Thus,
Thus: they can inject traffic with their own identity and a desired destination. Alternatively.
Alternatively.
the traffic can be aggregated from multiple ingress routers.
3. Legitimate users can send traffic in excess of their profiles. Ingress routers will re-mark excess traffic with a
3.
code point of a lower service class,
class, e.g.,
e.g.. AF red packets or best effort,
effort. which affects other user flows of
of that
code
class, as
as in a denial of service attack.
lower class,

3

Such attacks and others escape detection at ingress routers. Co-ordination among boundary routers or support from
core routers is required for detection. Changes that can be observed due to the attack traffic in the network include
longer per-packet delays, lhigher
~ i g l ~ average
er
buffer occupancy, and higher packet drop rates. We use these characteristics,
after- aggregation within the domain to detect
tics: specifically delays, loss ratios, and bandwidth achieved by flows after
bandwidth theft attacks and service violations.
Figure I1 depicts our proposed architecture. An SLA Monitor (SLAM) coordinates the monitoring activities inside
the DS domain. In the figure, the SLAM is shown as a separate entity in a network domain.
domain. However, any edge
router can take this responsibility as long as it has sufficient resources and computing capabilities. Loss ratios may
be inferred on a pure edge-to-edge basis or using core router assistance. In the core-assisted scheme, egress and core
routers send delay and loss measurements respectively to the SLAM for the flows in the domain. Upon request,
request: the
ingress sends the number of packets entering a domain per flow to calculate loss ratio. The packet loss is computed as
the ratio of the packet drop inside a domain to the total packets entering the domain. Loss ratio of a flow is a better
metric than loss rate (i.e.,
(i.e., number of drops per second). Another alternative is to measure delay,
delay, loss or throughput
using only edge routers using network tomography techniques. The SLAM maintains delay and loss information of
misbehaving flows
flows only.
only. In addition, the SLAM maintains the SLA parameters for each user for a certain domain. By
comparing the delay and loss measurements against the specific user SLA,
SLA, we can identify potential SLA violations.

4 QoS Parameter Measurement
Measurement
The SLA parameters used for detecting violations include delay,
delay, loss, and throughput. This section describes methods
to measure and use these parameters to detect service violations.

4.1
4.1 Delay Measurements
Delay bound guarantees made by a provider network to user traffic flows are for the delays experienced by the flows
flows
between the ingress and egress routers of the provider domain. Delay measurements either use delay of real user traffic
or injected traffic. The first approach is intrusive because encoding timestamps into the data packets would require
changing the packets at the ingress and rewriting the original content at the egress after appropriate measurements.
measurements.
The second approach is non-intrusive in that we can inject probe packets with desired control information to enable
an egress router to recognize such probes, perform measurements and delete the probes from the traffic stream.
stream. We
adopt the second approach in our design.
pre-configured
design. For each packet traversing an ingress router, with a certain pre-configured
tf,,,.,,,
Pp,.obe, the ingress copies the packet IP header into a new probe packet. A timestamp ting,.ess
is encoded
probability p,,.,b,;
into the payload of flow i,
i, and an identifier field is marked with a new value in the probe packet. The egress router
removes probes from the traffic stream, and computes delay]
delay; for a packet from flow ii of user jj traffic as:
as:

delay]

= t~g,.ess

- ting,.ess

(1)

where t&.,,,
t~g,.ess is the time the packet of flow ii traverses the egress router. The egress forwards
forwards the packet details
and the measured delay information to the SLAM. The encoded timestamp should follow a well-known forn1at,
f o m ~ a te.g.,
,
Coordinated Universal Time (UTC),
(UTC), and a standard protocol like Network Time Protocol (NTP) should be used to
maintain clock synchronization. Alternatively, the two-way delay from ingress to egress and back to ingress can be
divided by two if links are approximately symmetric.
symmetric. At the SLAM, we classify the packet as belonging to flow ii
of user jj and update the average packet delay of user j traffic,
traffic, avgJielaYj,
a v g d e l a y j , using an exponential weighted moving
average (EWMA):
(2)
a v g d e l a y j = a x avg-delayj ( 1 - a ) x delay;
(2)

+

where ex
CY is a small fraction to emphasize recent history rather than the CUlTent
current sample alone. If this average packet
delay exceeds the delay guarantee in the SLA, we conclude that a service violation may have occurred. If
If the network
is properly provisioned and all flows do not misbehave, delay for user jj should not exceed its delay guarantee.
guarantee.
Determining the probability with which we should inject probe packets is not an easy task. If there are M
n/I edge
N i flows
P~.obe is the probability
routers in a network domain, Ni
flows (on the average) passing through an edge router i,i: and
andP;.obe
that an edge router ii and flow jj will be selected to probe for latency, then ]\1 NiP~.obe is the average number of probe
packets injected into the network domain. To keep the volun~e
volume of these control messages low, we must select a low
probability. However, if the probability is too low, the chance of undetected violations is higher.
higher. Therefore, we vary

4

the probing probability value dynamically over time at each edge router. The change in this probability is perfonlled
perfomled
at all edge routers autonomously
autonon~ouslymaking sure the edges do not use the same random number generator sequence or
seed.

4.2 Loss Measurements
Packet loss guarantees made by a provider network to a user are for the packet losses experienced by its conforming
traffic inside the provider domain. To compute the loss ratio (rather than the less meaningful
nleaningfi~lloss rate), the number of
required. Core routers can detect the number
domain: are required.
packet drops,
drops, as well as the number of packets traversing the domain,
of packets dropped, and edge routers can compute the number of packets traversing the domain.
donlain. We refer to this
loss measurement
measurenlent mechanism as the core-assisTed
cor-e-ossisierlscheme for loss measurement.
~neasurenlent.An alternative mechanism is to use
stripe-based probing to infer loss characteristics inside a domain [15].
[15]. A series of probe packets is sent, with no delay
between the transmission of successive packets,
packets. or what is known as a "stripe."
"stripe." The scheme,
scheme, which was designed as
an end-to-end scheme, can be adapted to the edge-to-edge scenario and to QoS networks. We refer to this strategy as
edge-to-edge (or sTripe-based)
st,-ipe-Dosed) loss measurement scheme.
scheme.
the edge-To-edge
4.2.1
4.2.1

Edge-to-Edge Stripe-based Loss Inference
Inference

For a two-leaf binary tree spanned by the nodes 0,
0, k,
kl R
R1.
(see figure
figure 2),
2): stripes are sent from the root 00 to the two
1 , Rp2 (see
leaves to estimate the characteristics of each of the 3 Jinks.
receiver, we can
links. as proposed in [15]. If a packet reaches a receiver.
infer that the packet reached the branch point kk.. The first two packets of a 3-packet stripe are sent to a receiver,
receiver. e.g.,
e.g.:
R2, and the last one to the other receiver. A complementary stripe is sent in the reverse manner. The transmission
R2,
A k for node k can be computed as:
as:
probability AnA

k

=

ZR 1 ZR2

(3)

ZR 1 UR 2

Zi represents the empirical mean of a binary variable which takes the value I1 when all packets sent to ii reach
where Zi
otherwise. The mean is taken over n identical stripes. By combining estimates of stripes down
their destination and 00 otherwise.
each such tree,
R2 can be estimated. This inference technique
tree. the characteristics of links 00 -- k,
k : k -- R]
R1 and k -- R2
also extends to general trees. Consider an arbitrary tree where for each node k,
k , R(k)
R(k) denotes the subset of leaves
descended from kk.. Let Q(k)
R(k). For each (R1,
R2) E
Q(k)denote the set of ordered
ordel-ed pairs of nodes in R(k).
( R l ,R2)
E Q(k),
Q ( k ) ,a stripe
should be sent from the root to the receivers R]
R1 and R2Rp.
A QoS network domain defines different traffic classes to provide differentiated services. We extend the above unicast probing scheme to routers with active queue management that supports different drop precedences. For example,
exan~ple,
the assured forwarding
forwarding (AF) mechanism is realized using several queues where each queue has three drop precedences
referred to as green, yellow,
Pred
,d when the average queue size
yellow. and red. The red traffic is dropped with a probability p,
R min and Rmax.
R max . All incoming red packets are dropped when the average queue length is
lies between two thresholds RmZn
2: Rmax.
R max · Let P',,,
pi red be the percentage of packet drops due to the behavior of active queue management for red packets,
and let Piyelcow
pi yellow and Pig,een
pi green be defined similarly for yellow and green packets. These percentages can be computed
as:

>

max -- Rmln
Rmax
Rmi.n
P ' 1"ed --= R
Plred
x
X
R max
Rmox
max -- Y~nin
Ymax
y;nTn
'
- Y
P
Piyellom
=}7
yellow -

~ 7nax
'maz

P

'

P
red
Pl"ed

Pyellow +

X Pyellow

- G max

green .

max -- Rmax
+
R max
x 100
100
+ GGmaz
B

-

G min

Gm,ax

B

max
Gmaz
G

max X
Ymax
-- Y

B

X Pg,"een

100

(4)
(5)
(6)

where B
B is the buffer (queue) size.
Let P,.,,
P,-ed = 1 --P',.ed
pI red be the percentage of red packets accepted by the active queue.
queue. We can define percentages for
yellow and green traffic similarly using equations (5) and (6).
(6). Link loss can be inferred by subtracting the transmission
tra~~smission
L g , L yy,2and L,. are the inferred losses of green, yellow and
probability (A
( Akk from equation (3»
(3)) from I.
1. Therefore,
Therefore. if L,:
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red traffic, respectively,
respectively, the loss of a traffic class is expressed as shown in equation (7),
(7): where ni
n i is number of samples
i:
taken from traffic of type i:
_ ngPgreenLg
ngpgrepnLg+ nyPyello'll.L
R ~ P ~y +
~ nrPredLr
nrPredLr
~ I ~ ~ , L ~
L class -=
(7)
Lc~ass
n gg + n y + n
n,r

+ +

However, when loss of green traffic is zero,
zero: we take the average of yellow and red losses. When the loss of yellow
traffic is zero, we report only loss of red probes.
4.2.2 Core-Assisted Loss Measurements
4.2.2

An alternative method to measure loss is to record packet drops for every flow over a time interval .6.t
At seconds at the
core routers, and periodically report the values to the SLAM. The SLAM maintains the average number of packets
dropped for user jj,: aV9_dropj,
avg-dropj, and updates it as:
(8)

where 0"
dropj is the total packet drop for user j over time interval .6.t.
a is a smaJl
small fraction,
fraction: and dropj
At. The weighted
average resolves the problem of wrap-around of the total packet drop count during the life time of a flow.
flow. To compute
the loss ratio, incoming packet count information is obtained from ingress routers which anyway monitor all flows
for profile checking,
checking: shaping and marking.
marking. This ensures that core routers need not transmit information to the SLAM
unless there are sufficient packet drops to suspect attacks or violations.
The procedure to compute the )oss
CrrlcLossRnrio, executed every .6.t
At seconds,
seconds, proceeds as follows:
loss ratio, CalcLossRalio,
l.
I . Core ii reports to the SLAM whenever packet drop of user jj,, drop},
drop:: exceeds a local
locrrl threshold
2. The SLAM computes the total drop for time interval .6.t,
Att dropj
dropj =
routers.

N
.
2:::i:1
drop},
Nc
zZl
drop:: where AT,

is number of core

3. If
If the total drop for user j exceeds a global threshold
a. The SLAM sends a query to all edge routers requesting their current rates for user j
b. The SLAM computes total incoming rate for user j from all edge routers
c~mputes the loss ratio for user j as the ratio of dropj and the total incoming rate for user
c. The SLAM computes
j where both values are computed over the same interval
d.
d. If
If the loss ratio exceeds the SLA loss ratio for user jj,, a possible SLA violation is reported
Selecting the local threshold value after which drops are reported by each core router is difficult since the core
SLAs. For each AF class k,
k? we must compute a local drop
router does not have any information about the user SLAs.
threshold, T
Tkk. .May et al
a \ [22]
[22] give the loss probability for an AF class k as:
as:
B

LR k = 1

-2: kO"dn)'irk(n)

(9)

n=O

where Bk is the buffer size of the class k queue,
queue. O"k(n)
a k ( n )represents the probability that a class k packet is accepted
given that n packets are in the queue and 'irk
.irk (n)
( n ) is the stationary distribution of the buffer content. The local threshold
at each core router for class k packets can thus be set to T
Tk
= (LRk
( L R k + E)Aj,
€ ) A j : where Aj
X j is the expected arrival rate of
k=
user jj,: and EE is a small value. The local threshold limits state maintenance at the core router to the subset of the total
number of flows
flows experiencing the highest loss ratio, since we are only interested in flows that result in the aggregate
traffic experiencing high loss ratio. If
If a flow exhibits a high Joss
loss ratio, however, this does not mean that this particular
flow is misbehaving. Therefore, we employ throughput measurements as discussed next.

+

4.3 Throughput Measurements
Measurements
The objective of throughput measurements is to ensure no user is consuming excessive bandwidth and starving others.
This may not be detectable by a single ingress router if the user uses multiple ingress routers.
routers. The service provider
typically employs policies which allow users to consume extra bandwidth of lower service classes. The SLAM probes
egress routers for throughput following
following a loss or delay violation report. Each egress measures the average rate at
which user traffic is leaving the network domain. The SLAM computes the throughput for each user as the sum of the

6

bandwidth consumed
consunled by the user at all egresses. If this throughput exceeds the SLA bandwidth then there may be a
violation. The router may also periodically compute throughput values even in the absence of increased delay or loss
as a sanity check.

5 Load-based Monitoring
In this section, we discuss load-based domain monitoring used to probe the network domain for loss and throughput
only when attacks or violations are likely. As discussed in section 4,
4?headers of delay probe packets are copied from
froin
user packets so that the probes follow the same routes as the user packets. This technique is not applicable to loss
measurement using stripes since the SLAM does not know the egress routers from which user packets leave. The
stripe-based approach requires a pair of edge routers as receivers to send probe packets to, and we discuss how to
determine
detei-mine this pair of routers in this section. If
If many edge routers are idle or many links are under-utilized, the SLAM
does not probe the entire domain for loss or throughput information.
inforination.

5.1
5.1 Probing Strategy
Strategy
Let E be the set of all domain edge routers (both egress and ingress).
ingress). One of these routers can act as an SLA Monitor
(SLAM), or a separate entity can be used to act as SLAM. The algorithm proceeds as follows:
follows:
I.
PpTobe to probe the network for delays
1. Each ingress router copies the header of user packets with probability p,,.,b,
2. When an egress router receives these probes, the egress computes the edge-to-edge
edge-to-edge delay.
delay. If
If the delay exceeds
a certain threshold, it reports delay along with the identity of both the ingress and egress routers to the SLAM.
SLAM.
There is a trade-off
trade-off between checking the threshold at the egress versus at the SLAM, because in the former
case egresses need to maintain more information about the network domain, while the latter approach increases
communication overhead
3.
3. The SLAM maintains the set of edge routers E' to send stripes to,
tot in order to infer loss on active links, where
E' ~
C EE.. The SLAM also maintains a spanning tree of the network topology. A set of edge routers, Si,
Si,which
Si is
we refer to as complementary
colnplementary edges,
edges, is associated with each edge i.
i. The next subsection explains how Si
constructed.
t, the SLAM computes the set E' as:
constructed. At time tt

U

E'
( t ) = USi(t)
~i ( t )
E'(t)

(10)

i

Since E' C
~ E
E,, the communication overhead of probing for loss will be less than or equal to the communication
overhead of probing all edges. Another improvement can be achieved by maintaining another level of nodes in
the tree (parents) for each node. The SLAM can save probes by not using nodes at the same level and same
parent as complementary
complenlentary nodes for any particular node ii in the list.
4.
4. The SLAM probes the network for throughput approximation only when the inferred loss is higher than the
pre-configured threshold.
5. Using delay, loss, and throughput approximations, the SLAM can detect violations or bandwidth theft attacks
with reasonable accuracy

5.2

Complementary
Complementary Edges

With stripe-based unicast probing, the source needs to send certain packets of a stripe to a receiver and the remainder
of the stripe to a different receiver. Based on which shared link loss needs to be inferred, another edge router (leaf
node) of the tree must be used as a complementary receiver. For a given node V,
V. a sibling of V
V can serve as a
complementary
conlplementary node for V.
V . We describe an algorithm to find complementary edges for each edge router of a given
tree. These complementary edges will be lIsed
used to infer link loss from the root to all links up to the closest common
coinlnon
ancestor (CCA) of both receivers, and from the CCA to both end receivers. The union of the complementary edges of
two edge routers will give all edge routers to use as receivers in the stripe-based methodology to infer loss of required
links.
Algorithm ComplementaryEdges
(Tree
Cotnpletnet7t~1nEdges
(Tree T,
T, Node V):
V ) :The tree is traversed backwards starting from V.
If.
7

I. C 1 +- 0, P = parent(V)
2.
2. while P <>
<> root of the tree
Add leaf X
X to
to C
C'1 where CCA(V,X)
CCA(V,X ) == P
P
t parent(P)
parent(P)
P +3.
3. return C
C'1
This
This algorithm only needs to be executed initially when the network is setup and when it is reconfigured with additional
routers/links.
routersllinks. The result is
is stored at the SLAM.
SLAM.

5.3
5.3 SLAM Functionality
Functionality
For each
of the user using equation (2). Then
each incoming
incoming delay control packet, the SLAM updates the average delay of
itit compares
compares the delay to
to the SLA
SLA delay to detect violations for that user. If
If the delay has been violated, the SLAM
updates
EF
class, an
updates the
the list of edges
edges to
to send stripes to for Joss
loss inference. If there is any loss at the core for the E
F traffic class.
SLA
SLA violation is
is flagged.
flagged. If the inferred AF
A F loss ratio exceeds a certain threshold, the SLAM queries the edges for user
packet DS
throughputs and
and checks
checks whether there is a throughput violation. The SLAM also compares some report packet
of injecting packets with a higher service
fields
fields with the
the flow
flow SLA
SLA to ensure that an attack does not occur in the form of
than allowed for
for that user.
user. For each violation, the SLAM informs the administrator who may choose to throttle that
particular user traffic.
traffic.

Simulation Results
Results
6 Simulation
We
We conduct a series
series of experiments
experiments to investigate
investigate the delay,
delay, loss, and throughput approximation methods described in
section
ns-2 simulator [23],
[2311with the standard differentiated services implementation by a group from
section 4.
4. We
We use the I1s-2
[30]. TCP New Reno is used,
used: with a packet size of 1024
I024 bytes and a inaxinn~m
maximum window of
of 64 packets.
packets.
Nortel Networks [30].
We employ a similar network topology to the one in [15]
( 151 to evaluate both the core-assisted and stripe-based loss ratio
We
approximations. The topology is shown in figure 3. Multiple hosts are connected to all edges to create flows along all
approximations.
E l , E2 and E3 are destined to hosts connected to edge router E6
links in
in the
the topology.
topology. A number of flows
flows from El,
E6 to
links
simulate attacks
attacks on the link C4
C4 -- E6.
E6.
simulate

6.1 Delay,
Delay, Loss, and
and Throughput Approximations
Approximations
6.1
We measure
measure delay when the network is adequately provisioned or over-provisioned (and thus experiences little loss)
We
and then we simulate
simulate an attack on router E6.
E6. This scenario is illustrated in figure 4. Under light load, the end-to-end
end-to-end
and
E l -- E61ink
E6 link is
is 100
100 ms;
ms; El
E l -- E7 delay is 100
100 ms; and E5 -- E4 delay is 160 ms. With the attack traffic, the
delay of El
E l -- E6 link increases up to 180
180 ms (figure 4(b)). Since all the core router to core router
average delay of the El
router links
average
have a higher capacity than other links,
links, C4
C4 -- E6 becomes the most congested link, increasing the delay for all traffic
have
E6. The delay of the E5 -- E4 link does not increase because this path is not congested. Therefore, delay
traversing E6.
are a good indication of the presence of excess traffic inside a network domain. As previously discussed, the
patterns are
frequency of delay probing is a critical parameter. Sending fewer probes reduces overhead but using only a few probes
frequency
can produce inaccurate estimation, especially that some of the probes are lost in the presence of
of excess traffic. Figure
can
shows that introducing more delay probes may increase the delay of actual traffic. Figure 5 (b) shows that sending
55 shows
of
only 5 probes per second is inadequate because as much as 80% of the probes may be lost. Sending probes at a rate of
10 to
to 15
15 per second
second is
is a good choice in this experiment.
10
shows loss approximation using the core-assisted scheme. As the scheme uses an exponential weighted
Figure 6 shows
moving average
average of the drop
drop values and the number of incoming packets traversing edge routers, the initial approxmoving
values deviate from
from the actual values. Thus initial data (the first two seconds) should be discarded.
imated values
discarded. The
is very close to the actual one after that. According to the simulation setup, link C4 approximated value is
- E6 exhibits
E l -- E6 as depicted in figure 6.
6.
an increased loss
loss ratio for
for the El
an
for loss inference (as proposed in [15])
[ 151) produces reasonably accurate approxin~ations
approximations if
if core
Using striped probes for
routers do
do not employ active
active queue management or service differentiation. In assured forwarding, packets marked
marked
routers
as "red" have a high drop probability while "green"
"green" packets have low drop probability. We send stripes of
of different
as
colors to
to infer loss
loss in this case.
case. Figure 7 shows the loss of probes with different drop precedences. Figure 8 depicts
colors
8

the inferred loss of link C4 -- £6
E6 using these stJiped
stiiped unicast probes at different frequencies.
frequencies. The objective of this
experiment is to determine how often a stripe should be sent to infer Joss
loss accurately. The figure
figure shows that at least 20
stripes per second are required to infer a loss ratio close to the actual value. The figure also demonstrates that a longer
time is required for convergence in the striped-based scheme than in the core-assisted scheme.
scheme.
Figure 9 shows the throughput approximation of different flows
flows traversing a network domain. There
'There are several
aggregate flows
throughpi~tfor flow F1 that follows the path £3
E3 to £6,
E6, flow
flows going through the domain. We measure throughput
F2 that follows path £1
E l to £6,
E6. flow F3 that follows path £2
E2 -- £6.
E6. and flow F4 that follows path £5
E5 -- £4.
E4. Other
aggregate flows follow paths £1
in section
E l -- £7
E7 and £3
E3 -- £7.
E'i. The throughput approximation
approxin~ationprocedure
p r o c e d ~ ~(discussed
re
4) is used to compute the average rate at the egress routers. Figure 9 shows an initial fluctuation between actual and
approximated
measurements due to the average calculation. After a few seconds,
approxiinated throughput measuren~ents
seconds, the values are close to
each other. Measurement at the egress routers detects distributed attacks entering through different ingress routers of
a domain.

6.2 Detecting Attacks and Service Violations
In this section, we demonstrate the detection of mild and severe distributed denial of service attacks. In figures
figures 10
10 and
I11,
I, label "No attack" means the network does not have significant
sigi~ificanttraffic in excess of its capacity. This scenario has
little Joss
loss inside the network domain. This is the normal case with proper network provisioning and traffic conditioning
at the edge routers.
I '' and "Attack 2" denote situations when traffic is injected into the network domain
routers. Labels "Attack
"Attack I"
from different ingress points. At each ingress point the flows
profiles, but the aggregate
flows do not violate any profiles.
aggregate traffic is
excessive. The intensity of the attacks is increased during time t=
J5 secorlds
seconds to t=45 secorids.
seconds. The delay increases
t=15
by 30% during Attack I1 and by 50% during Attack 2 (figure 10). Packet drops of 15
I5 to 25% result in case of Attack
I,
1, and drops of more than 35% result with Attack 2, as depicted in figure II I.
I . We use equation (7)
(7) to compute overall
traffic loss in the QoS network.
The SLA Monitor (SLAM)
(SLAM) can thus aid in the detection of denial of service (DoS)
(DoS) and distributed DoS (DDoS)
attacks in a network domain. When the SLAM detects an anomaly
anoinaly (high delay and high loss),
loss), it polls the edge devices
for throughputs of existing flows,
flows, in order to detect high bandwidth aggregates. This is similar to the method used
in [21],
1211. where aggregate-based congestion control (ACC) agents match the prefix of the IP destination addresses to
declare high bandwidth flows
flows going to
t~ the
tlie same destination address. In our core-assisted scheme,
scheme, the core router
similarly
siinilarly sends the packet drop information,
information. together with the source and destination IP addresses to the SLAM.
SLAM. The
SLAM performs IP prefix matching to detect any possible DDoS attack through this domain. If there is an attack,
attack; the
SLAM sends control information to all ingress routers to throttle (filter out) packets of this flow or at least control their
rates. The differentiated services architecture
architecture can help to propagate such messages to the upstream domain all the way
to the source if possible.

6.3
6.3 Comparative Evaluation
Based on our experiments, we present a quantitative measure of performance to compare the core-assisted, loadbased and edge-to-edge approaches. We used the topology shown in figure 3 to experiment with the approaches.
We compare communication overhead, accuracy,
overhead, and flexibility.
accuracy, convergence time, implementation
in~plen~entation
flexibility. We
consider a domain D
2)with 11.-1
A4 edge routers and N
M core routers. The total injected probes and size of each probe packet
are used to compute the communication overhead in bytes. In the edge-to-edge
edge-to-edge approach, a stripe of s packets is
transmitted from the monitor to every egress routers pair. For the network domain,
domain; the total number of probe packets
is s x (M
(A4 -- I)
1 ) x (M
(A4 -- 2)
2) x f.
f . where f is the frequency
frequency of stripes per unit time. The communication overhead is
therefore s x (M
(A4 -- 1)
1) x (M
( M -- 2)
2) x f x packet-size.
The core-assisted loss measurement scheme overhead depends on the number of packets core routers send to the
SLAM to report excessive drop for certain flows.
flows traversing each edge router, and each
flows. We assume there are F flows
flow has P
P packets on average. We define ()0 as the percentage of misbehaving flows.
flows. If d bytes are required to record
max(1: ppa~:e~~s~ze)
a ~ ~ e ~ _ x s ' !control
e)
flow, then each core needs to send C = max(l,
packets to the SLAM.
drop information of each flow,
To compute the loss ratio,
ratio, the monitor
inonitor queries all edges for packet count information
infornlation of the misbehaving flows.
flows. Every
edge will reply to this query.
N)) x C packets (recall that N is the
query. The total number of packets exchanged is (2M
(2116 + N
number of core routers). Therefore,
N) x C x packetsize.
packet..13ize. We compute
Therefore. the communication overhead is (2111
(2nd + AT)
the communication overhead for the core-assisted
infor~nationprovided in [24].
[24]. In [24], the
core-assisted approach based on attack information
authors observed an average of 4268 backscatter attacks per week over a three week period of time by monitoring a

+

9

+

sole ingress link into a lightly utilized /8
18 network. They show that 50% of the attacks last for 10
10 minutes,
minutes. 30% last for
17% last for 60 minutes. 2% last for 5 hours and II % last for 10
10 hours or more.
30 minutes, 17%
Accuracy is computed using the deviations of approximating the loss ratio from the actual loss ratio value. We
calculate accuracy based on our experimental results,
results: with ff = 20 as the probing frequency for the edge-to-edge
approach. Implementation overhead considers which components of the network must be modified. The edge-toedge-toapproach.
edge approach needs to modify only edge routers, while the core-assisted approach requires change to both edge and
core routers. The edge-to-edge
deploy. However, the
edge-to-edge schellle
scheme is thus considered more flexible since it is easier to deploy.
core-assisted approach gives more insight into the performance characteristics of the network domain and has higher
time. Figure 12
12 depicts a quantitative comparison of the three approaches. Note
accuracy and shorter convergence time,
[24]. For a large domain with millions of flows
flows per second,
second,
flows as in [24].
that we use a high percentage of misbehaving flows
attacks. but it has
the core-assisted approach exhibits a higher communication overhead over a short period with many attacks,
a lower overhead over a longer time scale. The load-based approach is the same as the edge-to-edge
edge-to-edge approach in all
respects,
com~nunicationoverhead by probing only the necessary regions.
respects. except that it reduces comlllunication

7

Conclusions

We have investigated methods to detect service level agreement violations in QoS networks. These methods are
useful for network re-dimensioning,
re-dimensioning. as well as for detection of denial of service and bandwidth theft attacks. The
core-assisted loss measurement method is powerful but difficult to deploy.
deploy. An alternative edge-to-edge stripe-based
approach. a
loss inference scheme for different drop precedences was thus proposed. In the edge-to-edge probing approach,
Jow
low network probing rate has been shown to give incorrect results due to the Joss
loss of probes in case of excess traffic
caused by an attack. A large number of probes, however,
however. increases actual traffic delay and loss,
loss. We have shown that
different drop precedences is necessary to infer loss in a QoS network. Our proposed load-based
using probes with ditlerent
monitoring technique can aid in detecting attacks such as malicious traffic remarking or injection,
injection: without excessive
overhead. Our approach can be integrated with an adaptive admission control or flow control scheme to regulate traffic
overhead.
dynamically
dynainically and control an attack as soon as it is detected. The scheme can be used in any general network architecture
(not only a QoS network).
netwoi-k).
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